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Prospective Overruling and
Property Law
Cody Blake Bartlett
The thesis underlying Mr. Bartlett's article is that, in the property
area, courts can best fulfill their dual purpose of protecting vested rights
and modernizing judicial doctrines by the use of prospective overruling.
For too long the courts have adhered to rules of law that are obviously
erroneous, unfair, or outdated, the reason for this being that the judi-
ciary's function has been limited to the application of existing law because
legislative action is supposedly a requisite for change. Through an anal-
ysis of Supreme Court cases in which prospective overruling has been
utilized in other areas, several state court decisions which have made use
of this "tool for judicial housecleaning" in property cases, and the sug-
gestions of eminent legal writers, the author presents a cogent argument
for the implementation of this device by the courts in the law of property.
AN INTERESTING CASE once arose in New Jersey. Among
other things, the court said:
THE
mun
Univ
is a
igan,
Appellants ask this Court to explicitly and expressly overrule
the long established law of this state. This we decline to do.
Such action would be fraught
with great danger in this type
Aum'oR (A.A.S., Auburn Corn- of case where tides to prop-
ity College, B.A., Michigan State erty, held by bequests and de-
'ersity, LLB., Harvard University) vises, are involved. A change
practicing attorney in Detroit, Mich- of the established law by ju-
and a member of the Michigan Bar. dicial decision is retrospective.
It makes the law at the time
of prior decisions as it is de-
dared in the last decision, as to all transactions that can be reached
by it. On the other hand a change in the settled law by statute
is prospective only.'
Is all or part of this quotation a true statement? Is it a good expres-
sion of what should be the judicial function? Does it even make
any sense? The answer to these questions is that the above quota-
tion is judicial rubbish.
In the first place, a court does not have to act this way unless it
wants to. Like a neurotic person, a court may cause most of its
problems by thinking that something is when it is not. Second, no
legislature is going to act in a case like this one, a case in which the
' Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14, 76 A.2d 877, 877-78 (1950). This case will appear
several times later in this artide. The most significant part of the case was the mag-
nificent dissent by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, a judicial innovator in the common law tradi-
tion.
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construction of a paragraph in a will is involved. The court thinks
that the legislature should act, but the legislature will not trouble
itself with things of this nature. As a result, nothing is done. The
purpose of this article is gently to convince the reader that pros-
pective overruling is a useful tool in the area of property law But
prospective overruling is more than that: it is judicial self-correc-
tion and the highest form of the common law tradition. These
property problems, caused by rules that have outlived their useful-
ness or by decisions that were initially erroneous, were produced by
the judicial branch. Why not let it correct them in a manner that
will produce the least harm to settled interests and yet implement a
better rule for the future?8
Before defining terms or dealing with the material, a few words
should be added about the construction of this article. Basically, it
is the result of four cases decided in 1965 and two law review
articles written in 1966. This suggests, as indeed is the case, that
this is something new. More than that, it shows that prospective
overruling is a device that will be used more and more in the fi-
2 It is conceded at the outset that prospective overruling can be overworked. "But
total rejection of prospective overruling is an unduly crippling limitation of judicial
power." Keeton, Judicial Law Reform - A Perspective on the Performance of Appel-
late Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254, 1265 (1966).3 A few people have come to recognize that the legislature cannot, or will not, act in
many situations. These enlightened few have therefore had a few words to say on the
subject: 'The most compelling argument for an active judiciary assumes that, while a
* better agent of law reform, the legislature cannot or will not perform this function
and therefore the courts must assume a dynamic role in the development of the law."
Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 85 (1966).
However, this court will feel free to follow the Restatement rule hereafter if
the legislature declines to act on this matter. The Totten trust is itself a ju-
dicial creation, limiting the effect of statutory provisions, for the disposition
of property by will. It is therefore our duty to subject this judicially-created
doctrine to such limitations as are necessary to prevent the defeat of substan-
tive statutory policies. Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 195-96, 130 N.W.-
2d 473, 481 (1964).
"However, we do not share the view that a court-made rule, however unjust or out-
moded, becomes with age invulnerable to judicial attack and cannot be discarded except
by legislative action." Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279,
292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962).
"We are satisfied that the governmental immunity doctrine has judicial origins.
Upon careful consideration, we are now of the opinion that it is appropriate for this
court to abolish this immunity notwithstanding the legislature's failure to adopt correc-
tive enactments." Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618,
623 (1962) (the legislature had rejected bills removing immunity). For similar words
in a similar fact situation, see McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 193, 162 A.2d
820, 832 (1960).
The Supreme Court of Arizona, faced with the Holytz problem, had this to say:
"When the reason for the rule no longer exists, the court's responsibility does not ter-
minate because the legislature through indifference or otherwise has not acted." Her-
nandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 36, 369 P.2d 271, 272 (1962).
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ture. Two very important courts in the United States - the United
States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of New York -
have indicated that they will use it. In fact, the Supreme Court
has used it. The Court of Appeals of New York, on the other hand,
has not had a majority accept it; yet, an eager minority of that court
has. The cases are Linkletter v. Walker,4 Tehan v. United States ex
rel. Shott,5 and Johnson v. New Jersey' in the Supreme Court and
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel' in the New York Court of Appeals. The
two law review articles show current scholarly interest in the sub-
ject of prospective overruling. Professors Currier and Mishkin have
covered the topic in a thorough manner.'
I. WHAT IS PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING?
A. A Definition
Although the term "prospective overruling' is to a certain ex-
tent self-defining, a clear statement of what is being covered is
necessary:
Briefly stated, prospective overruling is the judicial technique by
which a court - eager to overrule an outmoded precedent but
reluctant to disappoint the expectations of the parties - applies
that precedent in deciding the particular case before it but simul-
taneously announces that it shall consider the precedent as over-
ruled in all future cases
This, then, is what this article is all about.
In turn, the problems in this area are implied by another defi-
nition:
Is it ever proper for a court to follow a precedent of which it
disapproves in disposing of the case at bar while at the same time
announcing that in cases thereafter arising the precedent will no
longer be followed but will be regarded as overruled? 10
B. A Judicial Half-SteP
Prospective overruling involves problems that are separate from
4381 U.S. 618 (1965).
5 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
0 382 U.s. 406 (1966).
7 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
8 Currier, Time and Change in Judge-MfadeLaw: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L.
REv. 201 (1965); Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56
(1965).
9 Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts,,
71 YALE L.J. 907, 911 (1962). 1
10 HART & SAcKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAw 620 (tent. ed. 1958).
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those of "simple" overruling. In the latter situation the court must
consider the purpose of stare decisis, a purpose which goes to the
very heart of the judicial system. In the former situation the prob-
lems are presented only after it has been decided that overruling a
previous decision is necessary. The problem here is that of line
drawing. When the court has decided to overrule, it has deter-
mined, in the context of the case before it, that a rule should cease.
Prospective overruling, on the other hand, deals with the situation
in which the rule has ceased, but the question is whether the rule
should be erased. It involves the question of what to do with the
new rule. Two rules have collided; does one engulf the other or
leave it in existence? Has the new rule blotted out the old one and
covered past, present, and future, or does it just tack on to the end
of the old rule and only cover the future? Acceptance of the latter
parts of these two questions means a judicial half-step. Although
prospective overruling may make it easier for a court to depart from
precedent, it does not directly involve the question of precedent.
Rather, it involves the process by which a court "legislates" to right
its wrongs.
C. "True" and "Untrue" Prospective Overruling
Once prospective overruling is separated from overruling, the
variations within the former must be considered. Therefore, once
it is decided that a case will be overruled and the further decision is
made that it will be overruled prospectively, the question becomes:
How prospective will it be? "A ruling which is purely prospective
does not apply even to the parties before the court."" This is Mr.
Justice Clark's view of prospective overruling," and Chief Justice
Desmond of the New York Court of Appeals agrees.' 8 The defini-
tion that this article accepted as a starting point also states this; yet,
"'true" or "pure" prospective overruling is only one of the four forms
that prospective overruling may take. They are: (1) denying the
use of the new rule in the case changing the rule, the "pure" form;
(2) using the new rule for the case that changed the rule, or giving
the victor his fruits; (3) denying the use of the new rule in the
overruling case and announcing that it will take effect on a future
"1 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 621 (1965).
12 The Linkletter situation is not "pure" prospective overruling, since the rule-
changer got the benefit of the new rule. All the Supreme Court cases have used the
Linkletter method.
13 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 78, 209 N.E.2d 709, 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 94-95 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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date, that is, acting like a legislature in the most obvious way pos-
sible; and (4) using the new rule in the overruling case and an-
nouncing that it will take effect at a future date.14
In any case in which a court has decided to act prospectively, it
must be decided which variety of prospective overruling should be
used. This is perhaps as important as deciding to use that method
of overruling. The decision should not be on the basis of what is
"true" or "pure" but on the basis of what will produce a just result
in the case at bar. In the variations of prospective overruling, the
court gets away from the question of the new rule for the future.
Here, the court looks at the other part of its function. It has thought
about the new rule for the future; now, the question is justice in the
present case. This article is dedicated to the position that in the
property area the second form of prospective overruling will usually
work best. Like Judge Scileppi in the Rosenstiel case,15 the belief
is that the rule should be immediately changed and the victor should
have his victory. A word of caution: this is not a dogma. There
are, no doubt, cases in which the victor should not get his spoils"
or in which the new rule should not begin with the date of the de-
cision. If this is indeed the situation, the court should apply the
variation that produces the most just result. That is one of the
duties of any court.
14 Almost all of the prospective overruling cases adopt either form number one or
form number two. For an example of form number three in a charitable or sovereign
immunity case, see Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962). For an example of form number three in a Torten trust case,
see Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minm. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964). For an example of
form number four in a sovereign immunity case, see Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17
Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). For an interesting and new variation of form
number three, see Myers v. Drozola, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
35 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 87, 209 N.E.2d 709, 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 102 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
16 For an example, see Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 241-48 (1961), in which he wanted a showing of actual reliance
by the appellant before he would give the party benefit of the overruled decision. As
this article later points out, reliance - especially in the property area - may well be
the main factor upon which prospective overruling depends. See text accompanying
notes 170-73 infra. Since this is so, there may be cases in which the victor should be
denied the benefit of the new rule because there has been bona fide reliance; otherwise,
without a showing of this reliance, be would get the benefit.
17 This might well be so in charitable immunity tort cases such as Molitor v. Kane-
land Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 IM. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 968 (1960); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1
(1960); and Kojis v. Doctor's Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 1 (1961) where
the courts might want to give the charity a reasonable time to obtain insurance coverage.
196,.[ 1209
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol.55: 1205
II. HISTORICAL OPPOSITION
A. Basis
Not an executive proclamation, not a legislative enactment, the
common law was something else. It was considered something that
had an independent existence and only had to be discovered and
declared. Like America, it was sitting there all the time, waiting
for someone to stumble across it. The bible for American lawyers
at an earlier time stated the dogma as it existed. It also mentioned
a problem that showed the weakness of this view: What happened
when a judge found something that later turned out to be a judicial
mirage?
[Ilt is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where
the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly
declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in
the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, accord-
ing to his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce
a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. Yet this
rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to di-
vine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not
pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from mis-
representation. For if it be found that the former decision is
manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the es-
tablished custom of the realm, as has been erroneously deter-
mined.18
This statement of Blackstone's does at least separate the "simple"
overruling problem from that of prospective overruling. Given his
view of the precedent problem, however, the manner in which a de-
cision is overruled follows: it can only be retrospectively overruled. 9
Perhaps if Blackstone had known and dared to admit that law is only
what the reason of the courts say it is, he would have been the first
to advocate prospective overruling; however, as he said, courts are
18 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 69-70 (1769). Parts of this rather lengthy
quote appear in many of the articles on prospective overruling. Since this particular
part of Blackstone was the core of American jurisprudence for so long, it seems improper
to reduce it to a line or two.
19 "From the declaratory nature of a judicial decision, Blackstone derived the neces-
sity that the decision have retrospective effect. If the decision interpreted a law, then
it did no more than declare what the law had always been." Note, supra note 9, at 907.
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"not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and ex-
pound the old one.""0 So the task for the courts was thought to be
finding the old law, hopefully the right old law.
America had its share of spokesmen for this view. How could
it have been otherwise when Blackstone was American law? One
of the best examples of this view was presented by George Shars-
wood' in a speech given to the University of Pennsylvania Law
School in 1854. Speaking of judge-made law, he said:
They are always retrospective, but worse on many accounts than
retrospective statutes ... [After discussing the constitutional pro-
tection of contracts, he continued:] There is no such constitu-
tional provision against judicial legislation. It sweeps away a man's
rights, vested, as he had reason to think, upon the firmest founda-
tion, without affording him the shadow of redress. Nor could
there, in the nature of things, be any such devised. When a court
overrules a previous decision, it does not simply repeal it; it must
pronounce it never to have been law. There is no instance on rec-
ord in which a court has instituted the inquiry, upon what grounds
the suitor had relied in investing his property or making his con-
tract, and relieved him from the disastrous consequences, not of
his, but of their mistake, or the mistake of their predecessors3 2
Four things should be noticed in this statement. First, it is even
more frightening than Blackstone's view because not even reliance
seems to have troubled Sharswood. Second, this was in 1854. Was
he correct in saying that there was no court that had inquired into
the reliance of a "suitor"? About six years before, an Ohio court
had apparently undertaken such an inquiry."3 Third, he was cor-
rect about one thing: retrospective court decisions have more harm-
ful effects than retrospective legislation. Fourth, it is interesting
that he used the term "judicial legislation." This would seem to im-
ply that courts do make law.
The above theory of the judicial process was what our courts
worked with. More than that, it was thought that it was the basis
of the courts' power and prestige. In fact, many people would still
say the same thing. 4
20 1 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 69.
21 Sharswood also edited Blackstone's Commentaries.
2 2 SI.RSWOOD, AN ESsAy ON PROFESsIONAL Ernmcs 45-46 (5th ed. 1884).
23 Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848). This case seems to have been the first
one in which prospective overruling was used. See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra.
24 Professor Mishkin is one of these. He spends a good deal of time talking about
it. Mishkin, supra note 8, at 58-70. Blackstone seems to be good law to him. On the
other side, Dean Levy says Blackstone's thinking is a "medieval carryover." Levy, Real-
ist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Ray. 1, 4 (1960). Profes-
sor Currier, as might be expected, goes along with Mishkin. The introduction to his
19671 1211
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B. American Cases
The cases covered here should not be thought of as the only
ones available. Unlike the other side, that is, cases which have used
the prospective method, a consideration of the cases using and advo-
cating the retrospective method could not attempt to be exhaustive.
The place to start is with the Supreme Court of the United States
and the first case in which the Court used the prospective method.25
Justice Miller, in dissent, could not go along with the methods of
the majority. He was worried about different results in the Iowa
state and federal courts. More than that, he seemed concerned about
leaving the sacred dogma of Blackstone:
I understand the doctrine to be in such cases, not that the law is
changed, but that it was always the same as expounded by the later
decision, and that the former decision was not, and never had been,
the law, and is overruled for that very reason. The decision of
this court contravenes this principle, and holds that the decision
of the court makes the law and, in fact, that the same statute or
constitution means one thing in 1853, and another thing in 1859.26
Mr. Justice Miller should not be too severely criticized, since
this has been the prevailing view of the Supreme Court.27 Further,
he had some excellent support from one of the "great dissenters":
"I know of no authority in this court to say that in general state de-
cisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have
had retroactive operation for near a thousand years."2  Thus, two
of the best statements of this view were in dissent. This might well
be a result of the fact that it was so deeply ingrained in the members
article states: "There are thoroughly modern values, both practical and psychological,
that frequently require that judicial change at least be 'absolute' in the sense that it be
allowed to reach past as well as future events." Currier, supra note 8, at 201. It has
been observed that this "thoroughly discredited notion . . . still rules us from its grave."
Keeton, supra note 2, at 1265.
25 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). The majority opinion is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
2 6 1d. at 211 (dissenting opinion). I cannot resist commenting on Mr. Justice Mil-
ler's complaint about a statute or constitution meaning different things at different times.
Of course they do and rightly so! Social conditions do change. Here, especially, it would
appear to be the case; 1859 was two years before the Civil War, and 1863 was in the
middle of it. This is an excellent reason for the meaning of a statute or constitution to
be somewhat different from what it was four years before.
27 Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp
v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962). He mentions this view in regard to con-
stitutional interpretations; however, there was no need to limit it to that. Rather, this
view of the Supreme Court was standard in all situations.
28 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910). Yet, within twelve years,
the Supreme Court was to rule that states could do this if they wished. Great No. Ry.
v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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of the Supreme Court that they did not have to articulate it except
in a desperate attempt to swing others over to their minority views.
The effect of this view was to put the courts in a strange posi-
tion: they could not change an old rule because undesirable effects
would flow from its necessarily retroactive application; on the other
hand, the courts themselves could not act prospectively because
courts are not supposed to act that way. So judicial change was pre-
vented because of the Blackstonian view and fear of judicial en-
croachment on the legislative sphere. The result was, instead of
judicial action, judicial whimpering about the legislature's acting.
In Crowley v. Lewis, 9 the question was whether a contract un-
der seal could be enforced against persons who were not parties to
the instrument on the theory that they were undisclosed principals.
The court recognized that "thousands of sealed instruments must
have been executed in reliance upon [a previous decision] .... ""
Therefore, it felt that it had no choice but to say: "We repeat that
we do not feel at liberty to change a rule so well understood and so
often enforced. If such a change is to be made it must be by legis-
lative fiat."31  A similar statement was made by a concurring judge
in a criminal case that prospectively overruled: "To approve their
action [the majority's) is to sanction a usurpation by the judiciary
of a legislative function.... To announce a rule of substantive law
for the future is solely the function of the Legislature."
32
New Jersey has the unhappy honor of having had two re-
cent cases which would have been ideal vehicles for prospective
overruling but which instead turned into echoes of Blackstone."3
They are noteworthy, however, because of the brilliant dissents of
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, who took rather a different view of the
judicial process.3 Finally, it should be indicated how widespread
this view was and what areas of law it encompassed. The answer
seems to be all of them.
29 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925).
So Id. at 266-67, 146 NE. at 374. This New York case presented a question with
the same problem presented in Rosenstiel. The problem, of course, was reliance.
1 Id. at 266, 146 NI.. at 374.
32 State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 635-36, 107 P.2d 324, 332 (1940).
33 Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952);
Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950).
34 He said: "The courts are under as great an obligation to revise an outmoded rule
of the common law as the legislatures are to abolish or modernize an archaic statute."
Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., supra note 33, at 149, 87 A.2d at 332. In
other words, let the branch of government responsible remove the problem.
1967] 1213
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III. THE SWING TOWARD PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
A. Law Is Reason
The acceptance of prospective overruling stemmed from the ac-
ceptance of the view that law is reason. 5 When examined in this
light, it becomes dear that a court decision serves two purposes:
(1) to produce a just result in the case at bar; and (2) to create
a reasonable rule for the future.36 The traditional theory tended to
mix these two functions together,37 and the result was an automatic
retrospective operation of a decision. It has been suggested that
the demands and realities of today's society require courts to act
along with the legislature as conscious bodies for legal change.38
In fact, even a scholar who is, in most cases, critical of prospective
overruling has admitted that a retrospective decision may be more
offensive to other branches of government than one that is pros-
pective. "
Fortunately for jurisprudence, some men in the profession be-
gan to look away from the traditional view and find that law was
not something already in existence. With this view came the in-
creased use of prospective overruling. One man, Lord Nottingham,
was far ahead of his time. He appears to have been the first man
to suggest that a decision need not have retrospective operation:
"But then in Chancery when men act according to an opinion which
hath long been current for law, they are to be protected, although a
later resolution have controlled the former current opinion .... 4
The date was June 1675! After making this statement, however,
the method was not applied in the case under consideration. The
reason was: "Besides 'tis one thing to purchase lands or leases upon
a current opinion, another thing to suffer an escape or commit a
wrong upon a current presumption, and since the judges have agreed
in this resolution to prevent a mischief, it were unreasonable to let
35 "Because retroactive operation of decisions is inherent in the common law system,
the hardship which it sometimes produces is ordinarily accepted as a necessary evil."
Note, 47 HARv. L REv. 1403 (1934). This is an older view.
3 6 LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 159 (1960).
37 Levy, supra note 24, at 3.
38 Id. at 1. Dean Levy seems to limit his appeal (no pun intended) for a judiciary
to act like a judiciary and not like a witch doctor, to the appellate level; yet, there is no
reason to make an iron-clad rule that trial courts cannot use this handy tool. See text
accompanying notes 133-35 infra.
39 Currier, supra note 8, at 230.
4 0 Pierce v. James, (Ch. 1675), reported in 73 Seld. Soc'y 182 (1954). I should
like to thank Professor W. Barton Leach for calling this case to my attention. I would
never have found it.
1214 [VoL 55: 1205
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in that mischief again by equity."'" Although Lord Nottingham
did not approve of prospective overruling in the criminal and tort
areas, it was nevertheless a long time before another judge expressed
similar thoughts.'
In addition, although Blackstone was the great advocate of the
declaratory theory, he seems to have forgotten it in at least one situ-
ation in which he said that criminal laws must have prospective
operation." Further, although not admitting it, Blackstonian judges
would use the prospective method when they had to.44 Still, these
small openings for realistic decision-making did not save the Black-
stonian view from the criticism that was later to provide the founda-
tion for a general assertion of the power to overrule prospectively.
B. The First Cases
The place to start is with the first decision of the United States
Supreme Court in which the prospective method was used. The
case was Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,45 involving the question of
the validity of municipal bonds. The Court did not have much to
say: "However we may regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the
future, it can have no effect upon the past."4" There was little in
the way of explanation, but it is dear that reliance was the basic
reason for the decision.47
The first such decision in a state court had occurred fifteen years
before.4" Bingham v. Miller49 involved the validity of legislative
divorces. The court said that only courts could grant divorces; how-
ever, because of the problems that would result from invalidating
41 Id. at 183. As I understand it, the case involved the escape of a beggar; however,
the important statement is that involving "land or lease." Lord Nottingham seemed
ready to use the prospective method in such a case.
42This is because Lord Nottinghams are rare. He was a great judge because he
was an innovator. His opinions sound as if they were written two hundred years later
than they were. To an innovator, prospective overruling is bound to be interesting.
4 3 BLAcKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 46.
44 Currier, supra note 8, at 216.
45 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). Mr. Justice Miller's dissent in this case has al-
ready been mentioned in connection with the traditional view of the declaratory theory.
See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
46 Id. at 206.
47 Ibid. "Subsequent cases continued to stress the reliance which parties had placed
on the only legal guides available at the time they entered a contract or other transaction."
Note, supra note 9, at 919.
48 See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121,
146-48 (1940) for a collection of the early cases. See also Levy, Realist Jurisprudence
and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960).
49 17 Ohio 445 (1848).
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previous legislative divorces, the rule would apply only to the fu-
ture.5" As in all divorce situations, of course, property was involved.
The court also said that if only property rights were at stake, it
would not be concerned about invalidating the legislative divorces
already granted.5' What it was worried about was the children of
second marriages, children who would be rendered illegitimate by
a retroactive decision." So the court warned the legislature to make
no future encroachments on the judicial power.53
So far as the protection of property rights is concerned, Jones v.
Woodstock Iron Co.54 is a decision to consider because it protected
reliance in a property case, and because the court prospectively over-
ruled a previous decision. It is an example of judicial houseclean-
ing. Another early state court decision is interesting not because
it overruled prospectively but because of the reason it gave for
overruling retrospectively. An Iowa court had held void a state
statute involving liquor control. The Supreme Court, in another
case, upheld a similar statute in another state. While saying it was
not bound to follow the Supreme Court, in McColluam v. McCo-
naughy55 the Iowa court said that it would. The court also held
that it would apply the new rule retrospectively in that case, since
"no property rights [have] been acquired in reliance on such pre-
vious decisions."56
C. Cardozo's View
Mr. Justice Cardozo has been the judiciary's greatest advocate of
prospective overruling. The reason for this has been a matter of
some debate. It has been suggested57 that his love for prospective
overruling was the result of his personal experience at the Colum-
bia Law School. When he started law school, the course lasted only
two years. Columbia then changed the requirement to three years
and applied the new rule to students already enrolled. Justice Car-
dozo refused to attend longer than two years, and he therefore never
received a law degree. That this is the reason seems somewhat
5o Id. at 448-49.
51 Id. at 448.
52 Ibid.
53 Id. at 448-49.
5495 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892).
55 141 Iowa 172, 119 N.W. 539 (1909).
56Id. at 176, 119 N.W at 541.
57 Note, supra note 9, at 911.
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questionable in view of his opinions in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.5" and Doctor v. Hughes,59 both of which would have been ideal
for the prospective approach. The better guess is that he borrowed
the idea from Dean Wigmore" after these cases had been decided."'
The really important thing is that he did get the idea from some-
place.
Cardozo's first recorded expression of the idea occurred in 1921:
"I think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too
great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld."62
But his next statement on the subject did not occur until 1932 in a
talk given to the New York State Bar Association: "The necessity
for such adjustments will sometimes call for the continuance of an
existing rule of law after its intrinsic error or inconvenience has de-
dared itself in practice."'  Within one year, he wrote an opinion
that made it constitutional for state courts to overrule prospectively.
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co."4 involved a Montana
freight-rate statute. The Supreme Court of Montana held that a
previous ruling was erroneous and applied the rule of the previous
case for the past, but not for the future.6  The argument is often
made that the retrospective operation of a decision violates the four-
teenth amendment. In this case, however, the argument was made
that prospective overruling violated that amendment. Mr. Justice
Cardozo, writing for the majority stated:
This is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retro-
active, and the novel stand is taken that the constitution of the
United States is infringed by the refusal.
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the sub-ject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward opera-
tion and that of relation backward. 66
58 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
59225 N.Y. 305, 122 NE. 221 (1919).
60 See WIGMORE, PROBLEM&S OF LAW: ITs PAST, PREsENT AND FuTURE 81
(1920): "[Just as the principles of non-retroactivity of laws and of non-impairment
of obligation are flexibly applied where needed by the judges, so also stare decisis has
only limited merit."
6 1 Wigmore's influence on Cardozo is noted in Ievy, supra note 48, at 9 n.28.
6 2 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 146 (1921).
63 55 REPORT OF N.Y.S.B.A. 262, 294 (1932).
64 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
65 The previous case was Doney v. Northern Pac. Ry., 60 Mont. 209, 199 Pac. 432
(1921).
66 287 U.S. at 364. The case received favorable comment in Note, Retroactive Effect
of an Overruling Decision, 42 YALE UJ. 779 (1933) and was criticized in Note, supra
note 35, at 1403.
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D. Approving General Statements
Finally, some independent general statements have been made
approving prospective overruling as a legitimate court function.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Judge Traynor have said that they
would urge it on the highest courts of New Jersey and California,
respectively." Long before that, Professor Kocourek proposed a
statute authorizing prospective overruling.68 And it was not long
until the legal encyclopedias came around.6" The broadest authori-
zation occurs in the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial
Ethics. Canon 19 says that a judge "may contribute useful prece-
dent to the growth of the law."7
IV. PROPERTY AND CONTRACT CASES
Since it is so difficult and arbitrary to try to separate property
and contract cases,7 they will both be covered here. It has been
said:
In general, as regards contracts, the liability of public officers, and
property rights, decisions should operate prospectively so far as
necessary to protect those who have relied on precedents now over-
ruled or on statutes now declared unconstitutional, wherever grant-
ing such protection is feasible. Recent cases, except those involv-
ing property rights, have usually upheld this principle.... [As
in criminal cases, there is such a dominant concern for personal
rights that decisions are usually given an effect which will protect
the individual. 72
67 Dean Levy stated that he had received letters from them to this effect. Levy,
supra note 48, at 23 n.73.
68 Kocourek, Retrospective Decision and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A.B.A.J.
180 (1931).
69 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194, at 326-27 (1940).
7o ARA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHics No. 19. This has been snatched out of con-
text, and so in fairness the full quotation should he included:
In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his
action in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked seri-
ous arguments of counsel. He thus shows his full understanding of the case,
avoids suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual
integrity and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the law. Ibid.
Dean Levy, in his article, feels that this is a general statement of acceptance of
prospective overruling. Levy, supra note 48, at 4. While the article would allow a
court to use the method, it does not appear to have been written with prospective over-
ruling specifically in mind. See People v. Mallory, 147 N.W.2d 66, 83 (Mich. 1967)
(concurring opinion) for an example of Canon 19's usefulness in judicial opinions.
71 "In a well-ordered society, protection of private property is the keystone." Robin
speaking to Batman. Batman, "'The Penguin Goes Straight, Part I," WNAC-TV Boston,
March 23, 1966, 7:30-8:00 P.M. E.S.T. In the Gelpcke case Justice Miller had a very
difficult time trying to separate property and contract cases. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 214 (1863) (dissenting opinion).
72 Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or
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This quote is typical in that it points out two things. First, there is
little or no serious objection to prospective overruling in the property
area." Second, although the commentators talk about it, the courts
do not seem to do it. People have relied on the system, and, be-
cause of this, courts are reluctant to overrule silly decisions. While
scholars think that this is the perfect place for prospective overruling
in the property area, for some reason or other the courts have lagged
behind. Professors Currier and Mishkin have had some harsh
things to say about prospective overruling in the constitutional-
criminal area; yet, they are firm supporters of the method in the
property area. 4 Now, the only problem is to find some courts that
have tried it.
V. TIME AND CHANGE - JUDGE-MADE LAW:
PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING 1965
A. One Court Thinking Seriously About It: Herein of
New York
In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel" all six members of the Court of
Appeals of New York were ready to innovate; in fact, they had no
Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L REv. 437, 447-48 (1947). Despite what was
said, the article found that the prospective method had not been used in cases involving
contract rights in property (id. at 442-43) or involving tax sales. Id. at 444-46.
7 3 Case Comment, 28 KY. L.J. 351 (1940), is the most, and probably only, hostile
article.
74 Professor Currier reasons as follows:
Thus a change in property law fairly cries out for prospective overruling.
This is so first because of the obviously great societal interest in stability in this
area, in lands tides, for instance. Reliance too is a particularly strong value
here. In property transactions, unlike tort situations, men tend consciously to
rely on existing law. To disappoint expectations reasonably based on such
deliberate reliance would dearly be unsound. On the other hand, though
prospective limitation of an overruling decision in the property field applies
different rules to persons in somewhat similar situations, it impairs the values
of equality and the image of justice only slightly. First, there is a rational basis
for discriminating between persons who transferred or acquired property prior
to the overruling decision and those who did so afterwards. Those who did
so before might and ought to have expected that their transaction would be
governed by the old rule, and this is not true of those who did so afterwards.
Currier, Time and Change in judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51
VA. L. REv. 201, 242 (1965).
Professor Mishkin has said:
There are some contexts in which protection of reliance might go to preventing
significant change, and in those circumstances outright prospective limitation
may be justified. However, these tend to involve contract or property rights,
areas which do not normally constitute a substantial factor in the business of
the Supreme Court. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 56, 70-71 (1965). 1 - "
75 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
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choice. The Court of Appeals had never passed on the question
before, but many lower New York courts had. In such a situation,
the person who relies on the lower court decision is generally con-
sidered to have done so at his peril.76 Besides encouraging a change
in the appellate process by advocating prospective overruling, Rosen-
stiel became the first case in the United States to recognize Mexican
divorces. More specifically, the court held that it would recognize
foreign divorces based on grounds not good in New York when one
party personally appears and the other is represented by an author-
ized attorney.77
For over twenty-five years, the Supreme Court of New York, at
Appellate Division and Special Term, had recognized these divorces.
No decision in New York had ever refused to accept the validity of
a divorce in the Rosenstiel situation. There were, however, deci-
sions against validity where there had not been this degree of per-
sonal contact or personal submission. As the matter stood, thou-
sands of people would have had their personal and property rela-
tions seriously affected if the court of appeals were to invalidate the
Rosenstiel case and apply the new rule retroactively. The majority
of four gave a blanket approval to these Mexican divorces.7"
The part of the case that is of the greatest interest is the minor-
ity opinions. Chief Justice Desmond, concurring in part, urged that
these collusive divorces not be accepted in the future.79 He was con-
cerned with the public interest, both in allowing such divorces to
continue and in overturning many final divorce decrees.8" Judge
Scileppi, dissenting, agreed with Chief Justice Desmond and ex-
pressed the view that, because of New York public policy, these di-
vorces were void.8' He also stated, however, that prospective over-
ruling should only be used in "the most compelling circumstances."'as
Rosenstiel shows that at least two members of the Court of Ap-
7 6 Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts,
71 YALE LJ. 907, 947 (1962). After the Rosenstiel decision in the appellate division
and before the court of appeals had rendered its decision, it was said that it was "almost
inconceivable" that the court of appeals would hold the way that it eventually did. VON
MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 919 (1965).
77 16 N.Y.2d at 74, 209 N.E.2d at 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
78 Ibid.
79 Id. at 75, 209 N.E.2d at 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
80 Id. at 78, 209 N.E.2d at 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95.
81 Id. at 86-87, 209 N.E.2d at 720, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 102. The last part of what he
said - about nobody being hurt - is not true. No matter what is done in a court
decision, someone will always be "hurt." What he should have said is that the fewest
deserving people would be hurt by his method.
82Id. at 87, 209 N.E.2d at 721, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
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peals of New York are willing to use the prospective method. The
question is whether the other members might find it worthy of use
in another fact situation. Judge Fuld is one of the majority of four
who has recorded his views on judicial change. Where commercial
and property interests are involved, he has said:
In such areas, any change of decision made by the courts would
necessarily be retroactive in application, and the courts have rightly
been loath to announce new rules which would adversely affect
transactions entered into in reliance on previously declared doc-
trines.8s
Since the legislature does not make law retroactively, Judge Fuld im-
plies that such changes should be left to the legislature. But could
not a man like Fuld, a man who likes to innovate, be shown that
the prospective method is a useful judicial tool? 4 Maybe he and
others on the court of appeals will be won over when the right fact
situation presents itself.8 5
New York had in fact used the prospective method many years
before in the property area. Harris v. jexs8 involved an action to
foreclose a mortgage. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court,
the plaintiff had refused to accept legal tender notes in payment of
the mortgage. The Supreme Court later reversed itself but the liens
were held not to be discharged because "plaintiff had a right to
repose upon the decision of the highest judicial tribunal in the
land." In effect, then, the court of appeals applied the Supreme
Court decision prospectively. It would therefore seem that the New
York courts have the authority and the desire to use the prospective
method should the proper case present itself.
B. A State in Love With It: Herein of Kentucky
There are scattered cases in many states, 8 but only Kentucky
seems to have adopted what may be called a consistent pattern. For
this reason, the development in that state will be traced. World
83 Fuld, The Commission and the Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 646, 647 (1955).
84 lathe conflict of laws area, Judge Fuld has shown that a new idea can win him
over. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.-
2d 133 (1961), he felt that prior cases precluded the use of the "center of gravity"
theory. His later opinion in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) fully accepted this theory.
85 Dean Levy has complained about the New York courts not using the prospective
method. See Levy, supra note 48, at 23-25.
86 55 N.Y. 421 (1874).
87 Id. at 424.
88 See Snyder, supra note 48, at 130 n.101 for a collection of the pre-1940 cases.
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Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp89 was an action on a fire insurance
policy. Previous Kentucky rulings were not followed, and it was
held that an "iron safe clause" was valid; however, this did not have
retroactive effect, nor did it apply to contracts already in existence
because there had been reliance on the prior decision.9" Rather, it
only applied to contracts made after the date of decision.9'
The Tapp court cited Eagle v. City of Corbin2 and Payne v.
City of Covington,93 both of which were municipal bond cases,9 4
Eagle dealing with a statute and Payne with the state constitution. "
These cases were the first in which Kentucky had used the prospec-
tive approach. Sunburst6 was also cited.
Mutual Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. O'Brien97 was another insurance
contract case. The question involved what was meant by the phrase
"occupation for gain or profit" under a disability policy. Overrul-
ing a prior decision, the court broadened the meaning of the policy
provision, but the change was prospective only and did not apply
to the case at bar." In the Tapp case, the court had also denied the
victor the benefit of a new rule. 9 In both cases, the victor was an
insurance company which could benefit from the new rule at a later
time, and denying it the benefit of its victory was the most just re-
sult in such a situation.' The insurance company tried to draw a
distinction between a statutory provision and a court decision, say-
ing that only in the former should a court overrule prospectively.'
Relying heavily on Tapp, the court did not accept this argument.0 2
In Hanks v. McDanell °. the Kentucky Court of Appeals moved
8 9 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 848 (1939).
901d. at 431, 130 S.W.2d at 852.
91 Ibid.
92275 Ky. 808, 122 S.W.2d 798 (1938).
93276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938).
9 4 Washington ex rel. Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833
(1963) was another state municipal bond case using prospective overruling.
95 These bond cases have been a fertile area for prospective overruling. Gelpcke
and Chicot were also bond cases in which the United States Supreme Court used the
prospective approach.
96 Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
97296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588 (1943).
981 d. at 824, 177 S.W.2d at 592.
99 World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp., 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 848 (1939).
100 What Professors Hart and Sacks call the "institutional litigant" is covered in
the text accompanying note 150 infra.
101296 Ky. at 824, 177 S.W.2d at 592-93.
102 Id. at 825, 177 S.W.2d at 593.
10a 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948). Professor Mishkin considered Hanks
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squarely into the property area with prospective overruling. The
case involved a will provision. The so-called "biting rule" provided
that, when a person had been conveyed property in fee simple, the
fee could not be cut down by a gift over after the grantee's death.
The court said that this rule could no longer be applied, since it
conflicted with giving effect to the testator's intent."' However,
the court preserved all vested rights acquired under the old rule:
"The cautionary rule against overruling prior cases settling rules of
property, to which we have referred, becomes eliminated when the
overruling opinion reserves such rights by giving that opinion only
prospective effect, as was done by us in Payne and other opinions."'0 5
The use of prospective overruling, at least in the way that the
court used it in Hanks, did not eliminate all of the difficulties. In
Stewart v. Morris. 6 the court said that the new rule was "mistakenly
applied" in the Hanks case, where the court had given the victor his
spoils. And the problems were not over yet. In Boyd v. Gray..
the District Director of Internal Revenue was having difficulty with
the new rule of Hanks, as clarified by Stewart:. The new rule was
applied, and, as a result, the marital deduction was held to have been
lost." 8 The case was appealed and later remanded to the district
court.0 9 This time, the effect of the Technical Amendments Act of
1958 was considered and the marital deduction was granted."' If
nothing else, the Boyd case shows that not even prospective overrul-
ing can avoid these tax troubles. Besides the tax difficulties there
was much complaint over the construction problems produced by
Hanks but none over the judicial method utilized by the court."'
C. A Court With a New Love Affair: Herein of Minnesota
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has been making the most in-
"unnecessarily sweeping" as a result of the prospective method used. MISHKIN & MOR-
RIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 306 n.11 (1965).
104 307 Ky. at 247-48, 210 S.W.2d at 786.
10 5 Id. at 250, 210 S.W.2d at 788.
106313 Ky. 424, 231 S.W.2d 70 (1950).
107 162 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ky. 1957), vacated and remanded, 261 F.2d 914 (6th
Cir. 1958).
108 Id. at 312.
109 Boyd v. Gray, 261 F.2d 914, 915 (6th Cir. 1958).
11o Boyd v. Gray, 175 F. Supp. 57, 60 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
111Matthews, Remnant Gifts Over in Kentucky, 44 KY. L.J. 397 (1956); Matthews,
Kentucky Developments in 1954: Personal and Real Property, Future Interests and
Trusts, 44 KY. LJ. 37 (1955); Notes and Comments, The Validity of the Gift Over
in Kentucky Determined Through Construction of Estate in First Taker, 40 KY. L.
350 (1951).
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teresting experiments with prospective overruling. Before coming
to the property cases, the tort area is worth mentioning. In Baits v.
Baits,112 parent-child tort immunity was abolished. The new rule
was applied in that case, and the court held that it would be used
for all torts occurring after the date of that decision.
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,'13 a case pros-
pectively abolishing charitable tort immunity, employed a different
method of prospective overruling."4  The victor was denied the
fruits of his victory, and the new rule was held ineffective until the
1963 Minnesota legislature adjourned. As was pointed out above," 5
this involves action similar to that of a legislature in the most ob-
vious way but also gives the legislature a chance to act. It prevents
the awkward occurrence of having a new court rule exist until the
legislature enacts still a different rule or reinstates the old one. It
is cooperation between the court and the legislature.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota was to use this method in the
property area. In Jeruzal v. Jeruzal"6 the question was whether a
Totten trust was subject to the widow's statutory share. The court
said:
Because of such widespread use of Totten trusts and the re-
liance which attorneys have doubtless placed on our previous more
general decisions on marital fraud, we will be guided here, and in
other cases in which the trust becomes absolute by the death of
the depositor before the end of the next session of the legislature,
by our previous decisions.117
In other words, these trusts were good until the legislature ad-
journed. Further, once more the victor did not get what he had
won. And, finally, it is interesting to note that reliance was not
shown in Jeruzal but was assumed. 8
It has been suggested that the Minnesota court will apply the
112 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966). This case, involving a conflict of laws, was
filled with innovation. In Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the "center-of-gravity" approach was used.
"13264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
114 It has been named "prospective-prospective overruling." Note, Prospective-
Prospective Overruling, 51 MiNN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
115 See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
116269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
117 Id. at 195, 130 N.W.2d at 481. About the "new" type of prospective overrul-
ing: "Prospective-prospective overruling represents a significant departure from previ-
ous concepts of overruling and is an important part of the legal process of those juris-
dictions adopting it. Note, supra note 114, at 81-82. For a collection of articles that
have at least mentioned this form of prospective overruling, see id. at 82 n.14.
118 Ibid.
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same method to invalidate revocable inter vivos trusts that are used
to defeat the statutory share of the widow."' The court in Jeruzal,
however, specifically stated that it was only talking about Totten
trusts."2 In any event, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has shown
that it knows when and how to use a judicial tool.
D. What the Federal Courts Think of It: Herein of
Miscellaneous Cases
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque.. was one of a number of munici-
pal bond cases and the first case in which the Supreme Court was
to use the prospective approach. In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank," the same issue and the same method appeared.
Bondholders who in a previous case did not question the validity of
a statute raised the question of its constitutionality. The Supreme
Court held that it was prohibited by the doctrine of res judicata from
considering the question of constitutionality, even though the Court,
since its initial action, had declared that the statute was unconstitu-
tional. 2
3
The prospective method has also been urged in a court of ap-
peals tax case. Commissioner v. Hall's Estate12 dealt with the ques-
tion of whether an inter vivos trust would be included in the
grantor's gross estate. The majority held that there was not a tax
due. " Judge Frank, dissenting, felt that there should be an estate
tax in this situation but would have remanded this case to see
whether there had been reliance on a previous decision. 6
These cases show that various judges and courts have exercised
what they have a constitutional right to exercise and have limited
a property decision to prospective effect. The questions suggested by
these cases are: Why have not more courts done the same in areas
where it would be useful? Why have not more judges innovated
to create a judicial tool for their courts that would allow them to
innovate more? The focus of this article now will move away from
119 Id. at 79 n.83.
120 269 Minn. at 196, 130 N.W.2d at 482.
12168 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
12308 U.S. 371 (1940).
123 Id. at 378.
124 153 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1946).
25 Ibid.
126Id. at 174.
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cases and articles that have been written and into the area of the
"why nots.'
12 7
V. THE WHY NOTS AND THE PROPOSALS
A. The Problems
There are two basic problems to be solved once it is determined
that prospective overruling is a valid exercise of judicial power. The
first relates to the treatment of cases involving the same question.
Prospective overruling takes care of all cases that arise after the
date of decision, but what about the cases that are, at the time of
decision, in different postures before other courts? And what about
the case that changes the rule? The second problem is a determina-
tion of what court, or courts, in the system should be allowed to use
this method.
First, the case in progress will be one of the following: (1) a
case in court; (2) a case in trial; (3) a case on appeal; (4) a case
with judgment final; (5) a case occurring partly before and partly
after (similar to the situation in Linkletter v. Walker) ;12 or (6) a
case arising from the same transaction (like the situation in Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302).1-29 The case in court,
that is, the case in which the rule is changed, is the one over which
the most controversy has raged. In general, it is best to apply the
new rule to the case that changes the old rule. In other words the
victor should be given the fruits of his victory. This solves many of
the problems of prospective overruling and also answers some of the
arguments against it.'
127 Before we leave the property area, it is interesting to see that a court can admit
that it was wrong and make changes. In the following case it should be noted that a
change was made even though people in the same situation had received different, un-
favorable, and incorrect treatment. In Lovering v. Lovering, 129 Mass. 97 (1880), a
gift to a group of the testator's grandchildren was held void. Later, another group of
grandchildren sought to claim their share under the same clause in the same will. In
this case, Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530 (1888), counsel for the grandchildren did
a thorough job and found the persuasive case of Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372 (Ch.
1853), a case which neither the court nor counsel had noticed in the first case. As a
result, the grandchildren in Dorr took their share. This is an illustration of what good
counsel and a good court can do.
Some courts even have two opposing lines of authority over certain legal questions.
Although this is not recommended judicial behavior, it at least shows that changes can
be made (although hopefully by accident in this situation). For such a result in cases
involving the Rule in Shelley's Case, compare People v. Emery, 314 Ill. 220, 145 N.E.
349 (1924), with Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911).
128381 U.S. 618 (1965).
12924 Ill. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962).
1 30 The appropriateness of this solution is discussed later in this section, after the
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The next group of problem cases involves those concerned with
the same question but which are being brought into court at slightly
different times. They may be in trial, on appeal, or with judgment
final. The first two categories present difficult problems and neces-
sitate some arbitrary line-drawing. With the last group, that is, the
judgment final cases, the parties are not entitled to the benefit of
the new rule because their cases were decided under the old law, the
law that was fit for that time. Even if the statute of limitations has
not run, they should not be resurrected. But with those still in the
courts, it is difficult to talk in the abstract. It is best to set down
no concrete rule; instead, the courts should wait for a proper fact
situation to present itself. At most there will be few of these so
that the problem of flooding the courts should not appear as it
might if cases with judgment final were allowed to be reopened.
In general, it would appear to be most reasonable to apply the
new rule to all cases which have not become final by the time of the
new decision. When a decision has become final, the parties have
been placed in a position of certainty. For better or worse their
rights have been adjudicated for all time. But with those cases
which are still being actively litigated, the difference between them
and the overturning case becomes less significant. The main dif-
ference is that of timing, for their cases might well have been the
ones to change the rule. When a case has become final, it is ap-
parent that no rule change will be brought about; therefore, the
courts have a reasonable basis for giving the benefit to active cases
but not to final ones on which the statute of limitations has not yet
run.
Linkletter v. Walker 3' illustrates another serious problem. The
defendant was arrested after Miss Mapp, but his judgment was final
before the Supreme Court decided her case. The problem, then, is
that of the time of the "occurrence" and of the final court decision.
Again, it seems safe to establish a rule that will apply in most cases
without dosing the door to possible fact situations that would re-
quire a different method. Such a rule would make the date of the
decision, not that of the transaction involved, the crucial date. In
other words, the method that was used in Linkletter is most accept-
able.
One case shows a situation in which the time of the occurrence,
various arguments against prospective overruling have been considered. See text ac-
companying notes 167-69 infra.
131381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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not the decision, should control. This was Molitor."2  The prob-
lem was that other cases had arisen from the same transaction. Ini-
tially, the court tried to take the position that the date of the deci-
sion controlled, but litigation showed the unfairness of this result;
therefore, those in the same transaction were also allowed the bene-
fit of the new rule.'33 In such a situation, courts should make the
new rule applicable to those who are, in effect, in the same position
as the party who caused it to be changed.
The second major problem is this: Which courts should have
this power? Although it will mostly be done on the appellate level,
there is no reason why the lower courts cannot make use of this
judicial tool. In State v. Koonce'34 a trial court showed that it
could use the method and use it very well. There is no reason for
the highest court of any jurisdiction to say that the lower courts
may not prospectively overrule when the proper case has been pre-
sented to the trial court. All courts should feel free to use it whether
or not it has been urged on the court by a party.
B. Arguments Against Prospective Overruling
The arguments against prospective overruling run as follows:
(1) it is dictum; (2) it is a legislative function; (3) appeal in-
centive is destroyed; (4) there is no restraint on the judiciary; and
(5) courts are to decide issues after they arise.
The big argument - in fact, the one that overlaps arguments
(2) and (5) above - is that any prospective overruling is nothing
more than dictum. The purest expression of this argument ap-
peared in a student comment on Payne v. City of Covington."'
With the zeal that can be displayed only by a law student, he said:
"If this is true, the statements to the effect that prior decisions are
overruled are pure dictum in the truest sense of the word."'38  The
best answer to this statement - and that is all that it can be con-
sidered, for it makes no argument-is: "But what is the significance
of that fact?"'3 7 This question points out that saying it is dictum is
nothing more than high-grade name-calling. Nothing has been
132 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26-27, 163
N.E.2d 89, 96-97 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
133 24 Ill. 2d at 470, 182 N.E.2d at 146-47.
134 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. 1965).
135 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938). See text accompanying notes 92-96
supra.
13 6 Case Comment, 28 Ky. L.J. 351, 354 (1940).
137 MISHKIN & MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 103, at 308.
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said, except that such language in a decision fits into the neat little
compartment that has been labeled dictum. It is dean and neat; it
is mechanical; but it does not answer any questions or make any
arguments. It is legitimate criticism when some reason is added to
it. The reason is that when a party who was not present in court
is prevented from appearing to have his day in court, the decision
should be considered dictum as to him."' This is where the dictum
objection has its only thrust: there may be cases in which a court
will feel that a man in a certain situation has been denied his day in
court. Then, what the court previously said might well be con-
sidered dictum so far as this specific person is concerned. Otherwise,
mere name-calling does not do much because the term "dictum"
really does not mean much.3 Professor Mishkin considered such
prophecies to be superior to, and a substitute for, prospective over-
ruling 40 Dean Levy calls such statements "warnings" and says
that since courts issue them all the time, there is no reason to dimin-
ish the importance of prospective overruling by calling them
dicta.1
41
The legislative-function argument ties in closely with those re-
138Id, at 310.
139 Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or
Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L. REv. 437, 440 (1947): 'The real objection
to calling such pronouncements dicta lies rather in the fact that, as prophecies, they are
unquestionably entitled to be given more significance than remarks made in passing."
140 MsBKN & MoRius, op. cit. supra note 103, at 302.
It seems rather difficult to draw the line between prospective overruling and mere
"prophecies." In a case involving a change in the law relating to bona fide purchasers
of usurious notes, an Arkansas court spoke in terms of "caveat," but really prospectively
overruled: 'We give this caveat prospectively, so as not to entrench on property rights
acquired by reason of our previous opinions, and this caveat applies to all transactions
entered into after this opinion becomes final." Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp.,
220 Ark. 601, 610, 249 S.W.2d 973, 978 (1952).
141 Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 21 (1960). Professor Robert E Keeron had this to say about the dictum and closely
related advisory-opinion arguments:
They fail to take due account of the fact that consideration of the prospectively
applied rule was legitimate because it could have been made dispositive of the
litigation before the court. That a different line of reasoning might have pro-
duced the same result the court reached does not deprive the judicial opinion
of its quality as the court's own explanation of its considered choice concern-
ing the potentially dispositive rule.
Keeton, Judicial Law Reform - A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254, 1265 (1966). To those who wish to persist with dictum
name-calling, he adds:
It is then a dictum especially useful in predicting future decisions, since it
almost certainly will be fortified as holding the next time the question comes
before the court. In short, if we look to fact and function rather than to form,
prospective overruling by courts is not the exercise of a basically new power,
but only a modified exercise of a familiar power. Id. at 1266.
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lating to dictum and courts deciding issues after they arise." In
fact, these are really three forms of the same view, one which pro-
duces the constitutional overtones that are to be discussed later in
this section.' For this reason, nothing will be said about the leg-
islative-function argument at this point. Rather, the other strong
argument against prospective overruling will be considered.
This argument concerns what has been called "appeal incen-
tive.""' If all the courts in a jurisdiction are known to use pros-
pective overruling, then the argument might better be called "liti-
gation incentive." "Indeed, the recognition of even a substantial
possibility of such limitation will tend to deter counsel from ad-
vancing contentions involving novelty or ingenuity and will lead
them to focus on other aspects of their cases."' 45  This is Professor
Mishkin speaking; yet, in another piece of writing by him,'46 he
stated the answer to this argument. He said that in most cases there
would be no harm because the person would still be going all out
for a complete victory.'47 Further, he implied that even in cases
where prospective overruling does discourage litigation, it does not
matter because it is not for the courts to try to stimulate judicial
business.'48 Rather, this is something that should be legitimately
left to the legislature.'49
The two considerations that Professor Mishkin did not discuss
involve the so-called "institutional litigant"'50 and the possibility of
14 Prospective adjudication raises difficult problems concerning the nature of
a court's functions; persuasive arguments can be made that courts are badly
suited for the general determination and proclamation of future rules and,
indeed, that for them to do so violated the Constitution's grant to the judiciary
only of power over "cases" and "controversies." Cox, The Supreme Court,
1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 140 (1966).
This is the best statement of the reason behind the legislative function argument.
The reasons are seldom stated, but, rather, seem to be assumed. "Rarely have courts
explained their reluctance to overrule well-established case law, preferring to rely on the
conclusory phrase 'only the legislature can legislate.'" Note, supra note 114, at 84.
143 See text accompanying notes 161-66 infra.
144 Judge Scileppi, dissenting, and Chief Justice Desmond, concurring, were con-
cerned about this in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 88, 78, 209 N.E.2d 709,
721, 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 103, 94-95 (1965).
14 5 Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 61 (1965).
146 MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS (1965).
147Id. at 311.
1481d. at 312.
149 Id. at 310-14.
150 HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 623 (tent. ed. 1958). Professor Mishkin does mention in-
stitutional litigants in his article. He said that that is an "inadequate excuse" if other
non-institutional litigants are discouraged. Mishkin, supra note 145, at 61 n.20.
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the victor getting the benefit of the new rule. Both of these con-
siderations involve the question of fairness to the successful party
in court. It would be possible to have one rule for institutional
litigants (not giving the victor his fruits) and a converse rule for
non-institutional litigants. This would produce fairness in the indi-
vidual case. Of course, a blanket application of giving the victor
the benefit of the new rule makes such considerations unnecessary.
The only problem with this approach is that the loser has relied on
the system as best he could at the time, while the victor did not;
rather, he got his victory by changing the system. It is difficult to
prefer one over the other. Here, reasonable reliance is matched
against giving a reward to a person who has earned it.
In general, the preference should be for the winner. The pres-
ence or absence of institutional litigants, as indicated above,15 1
would be a possible criterion for differentiating between cases in
which the victor is given his fruits and those in which he is not.
The appeal incentive would not be diminished for litigants who
can later benefit from their rule, and the person who relied on the
previous system is protected. But this form of discrimination is
rather difficult for a court to explain. When all considerations are
weighed, therefore, the blanket rule of giving the victor the benefit
of the new rule seems best.
There is some force in the argument that prospective overruling
removes needed restraint on the judiciary, 5 ' but this argument cuts
both ways. If courts are too restrained, they do not serve their func-
tion of changing rules that no longer have meaning. A court can-
not always say "Leave it to the legislature." Instead, courts must
be free to correct that which is erroneous, especially when that error
is court made. If a court is to act like a court, it cannot be too re-
strained." 3 Faced with this necessity, it would seem to be worth the
1 51 See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
15 2 Cox, supra note 142, at 137. See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L REV. 201, 226 (1965):
Forcing courts to overrule retroactively or not at all tends to minimize ob-
jectionable judicial legislation - that is, judicial legislation that is in some
way disruptive of the harmonious functioning of a multipartite government -
by rendering it difficult for a court to overrule a prior decision because of
the injury that will result from retroactive application of the newly announced
rule to interests that have been created in reliance upon the old rule. Ibid.
153 M SHKN & MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 103, at 306: "In situations of this kind,
then, if courts had no alternative but to operate with retroactive effect, judicial change
of some existing rules of law - no matter how bad they might now appear to be -
would be totally unavailable."
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chance that the judiciary will have sufficient self-restraint to use this
judicial tool in a proper manner.
The final argument arises when a court announces a new rule
and then says that it will be prospective only. This argument does
not aim at prospective overruling itself but rather at announcing a
new rule and then giving it prospective effect in the same case. "A
court's use of deliberate silence about the retroactive effect of a
judicial decision should be regarded as another technique of declin-
ing jurisdiction in the case of institutional competence; in short, a
passive virtue."'1 54 This is what the Supreme Court did with Mapp
v. Ohio,'55 Griffin v. California,'56 and Escobedo v. Illinois.5"  The
conclusion is that the proper approach was taken in the follow-up
cases of Linkletter v. Walker,"58 Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott,159 and Johnson v. New Jersey.6' The preferable view, how-
ever, is that the decision as to prospective application should be
made at the time that the new rule is announced. This clarifies the
situation. By doing this the court will have considered the effect
of the new rule in such cases and will have said that it should be
applied only prospectively. It will have heard a case or controversy.
Further, a decision will then save the court's time and the time and
expense of individuals bringing later actions to determine whether
the rule will be applied retrospectively. The strongest arguments
for using the Mapp-Linkletter approach are in the constitutional
area where there is merit to allowing a cooling-off period for adjust-
ment to the new rule and also for thought.
The argument of courts deciding issues after they arise greatly
overlaps with constitutional arguments, arguments which it is time
to examine.
C. Constitutional Problems
With respect to legislative action, there are many restrictions on
154 Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 935-36 (1962). This article is critical of Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which the new rule of insanity was an-
nounced and given prospective effect only. The reasons for objection were: (1) the
question was not before the court; (2) the court did not know the effect of the number
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus; (3) the issue had not been raised and briefed
in trial court; and (4) it is more equitable to apply the rule on a case-by-case basis.
Note, supra at 936-37.
155 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
156380 U.S. 609 (1965).
157 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
158381 U.S. 618 (1965).
159 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
160382 U.S. 406 (1966).
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the retroactive application of statutes: (1) due process; (2) bills of
attainder; (3) ex post facto laws; and (4) laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts.1 ' Courts do not have these restrictions, nor do
they have the benefits that flow from them. If the restrictions did
apply, the prospective method would be a requirement and not just
a happy alternative. The Constitution cuts the other way so far as
prospective application by courts is concerned. Here, the courts
have to answer constitutional arguments instead of being able to
rely on constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court has taken
care of the constitutional arguments against prospective overruling.
The first constitutional argument raised was that of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. As stated above,'62 the Sunburst
decision put an end to this argument.0 3 There is also a due process
provision under the fifth amendment. This, of course, does not ap-
ply to the states but only to the federal government. Apparently,
the due process clause of the fifth has never been raised to question
the validity of prospective overruling. If it were, there is no rea-
son to assume that due process here would mean something differ-
ent for the federal government from that which it means for the
states under the fourteenth amendment. In other words, the Sun-
burst reasoning should apply under the fifth amendment also.
The other constitutional argument has already been touched up-
on in this section.' It is the article III, or cases and controversies,
argument. Mr. Justice Black raised this for the first time in James
v. United States."5 The Court considered and answered it in Link-
letter: prospective overruling does not violate article III of the Con-
stitution.'
D. The Solution
Now that it has been shown that technical problems can be
handled, that the arguments against prospective overruling are not
too forceful, and that constitutional problems have been solved, it
10 1 HART & SAcHs, op. cit. supra note 150, at 640-43.
-12 See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
103 Note, Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Decision, 42 YALE L.J. 779, 781
(1933): "In reaching this conclusion, the Court entertained the view that no distinc-
tion is to be drawn between the position of the litigant who seeks to have an overruling
declaration operate only prospectively and the position of the one who desires its retro-
active application.'"
164 See text accompanying notes 135-43 supra.
165 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
166 381 U.S. at 629.
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is time to consider what type of prospective overruling is generally
the best. As was mentioned above,'67 it is the "untrue" form of
prospective overruling - the victor gets his victory 6 ' - that was
advocated by the dissenting opinion in Rosenstiel.'69 The new rule
would generally not be applied to cases which were final before its
promulgation. Further, the decision's prospective effect would be
made in the case in which the new rule was announced. This is the
type of prospective overruling that seems best. Again, it should be
urged strongly that this is not an inflexible rule. With something
like prospective overruling, there can be no inflexible rules. That
is really what prospective overruling is all about; it is a judicial tool
for judicial housecleaning. Courts should not be restricted by arbi-
trary rules when the whole purpose of this method is to free them
to innovate where innovation is badly needed. The question now
becomes when is it needed?
VI. FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED IN THE USE OF
PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
This section is a summary of what has been scattered through
previous sections. To summarize, the factors are: (1) whether
there has been reliance upon previous decisions; (2) whether the
purpose of the new rule will be best served; (3) whether adminis-
tration of the courts will be facilitated; (4) whether the courts feel
inhibited when a new and better rule is needed; and (5) whether
it is a fit area for judicial "legislation." Of these, the reliance fac-
tor is by far the most important.
No one seems to feel that prospective overruling is improper
where there has been reliance and someone will be hurt by a retro-
active application of the new rule.' The controversy is over what
167 See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
168 Professor Currier expressly disagrees with this method. Currier, supra note 152,
at 215.
169 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 79, 209 N.E.2d 709, 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 95 (1965).
170 The author in Note, supra note 139, at 440 called this the only blanket test, but
added that there is always a question of what it is. Professor Mishkin considered re-
liance as a valid factor calling for prospective overruling. Mishkin, supra note 145, at
71 n.47. Professor Currier had this to say: "Interests may have been created in reliance
on the old precedent that are deserving of protection; and society may have a predomin-
ant interest in stability in the affected area, if a rule of property, or similar institutional
rule demanding stability, is involved." Currier, supra note 152, at 225. See also id. at
242. Snyder agrees. Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL.
L. REV. 121, 146-53 (1940).
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is justified reliance." Further, once a good argument has been
made against an existing rule, a good argument has also been made
against prospective overruling because the more an old rule is criti-
cized and limited, the less justifiable reliance upon it becomes.'
There is the further question of whether reliance is justified even if
it did exist. Although this objection is strongest in the tort and
criminal cases, it has little merit in the property and contract areas
where honest men have acted reasonably in attempting to structure
their affairs.'
The second factor is the purpose of the rule that is newly an-
nounced. If it is to correct what is now a socially improper rule,
then the argument for prospective overruling is strong. When a
change in social conditions requires a change in the law, there is
reason to let the old rule apply to the old situations and the new one
to future situations. A rule that is future-oriented should apply only
in the future.
Third, is the factor of administration in the courts. 4  Prospec-
tive overruling may be validly invoked when a court is seriously
concerned about flooding itself with other cases of a similar na-
ture. 5 This concern is especially great where thousands of con-
victs may petition for release or thousands of land titles may be
overturned. While it should not be the sole basis for making a
rule prospective, it is a factor to be considered. A court is on weak
ground when it denies justice because it is worried about its work
load. Yet, when no injustice will result, judicial administration is a
legitimate concern. Since Mapp was based on what was a change
in social conditions and outlook, making that prospective and sav-
ing the courts from a flood was the reasonable thing to do.
1 7 1 Cardozo felt that real reliance was much rarer than was commonly supposed.
55 REPORT OF N.Y.S.B.A. 262, 295 (1932). And Gray agreed. GRAY, THE NATURE
AD SOURcES OF THE LAw 100 (2d ed. 1921).
172 Mr. Justice Miller in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 219
(1863) (dissenting opinion), pointed out how the old rule had been weakened and,
with it, reliance: "[A]fter a struggle of seven or eight years, in which this question has
always been before the court, and never considered dosed, this case may now be con-
sidered as finally settling the law on that subject in the courts of Iowa." In the Mapp
situation, it has been pointed out that the states had little reason to rely on Wolf, be-
cause of the constant encroachment on the rule of that case. Mishkin, supra note 145,
at 75.
173 "In this century many courts have limited the retroactive effect in situations where
there has been reliance on the prior law or where stability was particularly valued."
Note, Prospective-Prospecive Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REv. 79, 80 (1966).
174 Note, supra note 154, at 950.
17r Professor Currier feels that this is really a problem only in the criminal area.
Currier, supra note 152, at 240, 257-58.
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The last two factors are really alternative methods of combining
the first three. In prospective overruling the court has a tool to
reduce its inhibitions,"7 6 but weighed against this is the question of
whether this is a fit area for judicial lawmaking. Both are impor-
tant factors, and a court should consider them when deciding
whether or not to use the prospective method.
VII. WHERE PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING WOULD
WORK WELL IN THE PROPERTY AREA
A few suggestions will be made about areas in which prospec-
tive overruling could be used to bring about some needed improve-
ment"' For example, it could be used in the perpetuities area.
One specific place would be to allow medical testimony to be admit-
ted to prove that a man or woman is incapable of having children.
Yet, generally, perpetuities is not a good place for application of
the prospective method. Perpetuities problems are something that
people try to avoid. As a result, the reliance factor is eliminated.
However, courts may wish to use prospective overruling as a form of
housecleaning when some troublesome rule is involved there.
Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, where they have not
been limited by statute, are excellent subjects for the prospective
approach. Here, the method could be used to reduce the lives of
these harsh rules. The element of reliance is very strong, and a
method for protecting this reliance will encourage judicial innova-
tion.
In the tax sale area, the element of reliance is weak for both the
buyer and the person who will reclaim, because the buyer is warned
that there is a right of redemption and the reclaimer has let the
property go. Neither of these parties stands in a very good position
to make a claim of justified reliance. However, when courts are
worried about overturning many tax titles, the prospective method
is available.
Two very common and harmful rules exist with respect to wills.
In this country, a child may be disinherited and a widow may be
176 Note, supra note 154, at 910-11, mentions the inhibiting factor of disappointing
reasonable expectations.
177 This last section is nothing more than a suggestion of situations in which the
prospective method could have been, or should be, used as well as the general areas of
application. The specific examples are only some rather obvious places for the prospec-
tive method. They should not be thought of as the only examples possible.
It should be remembered that the purpose of this article is to advocate a specific
form of innovation, not to propose specific innovations that should be made.
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deprived of her statutory share by the use of a revocable trust.8
The use of the trust to prevent the widow's getting her forced share
is especially offensive in that it may be used although it is not ac-
cepted in the state in which the testator was domiciled at his death.
A trust may be set up in another state, may provide that the laws
of that state govern, and therefore be good to defeat the claim of
the widow. A New York resident can set up a revocable trust in
Massachusetts and put all of his assets in it to defeat the claim of his
widow. There has been reliance in disinheriting the children and
preventing the widow's getting her statutory share. If a court feels
that this is the type of reliance that should not be encouraged in
the future, it could use the prospective method to advantage and
not upset the plans of those who had relied upon past decisions.
To get down to specific cases, prospective overruling could be
used to correct the Kentucky rule that a man can adopt his wife. In
Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r,'79 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
reached this interesting but rather foolish result. It could never
have been in the mind of the legislators to create such a possibility.
Since people have relied, and are relying, on this case to draft wills,
the court could correct its own error with the least possible harm by
the prospective method. As was pointed out above,' Kentucky
has a certain liking for the prospective method, and such a ruling
should be very possible.
The above are all suggested instances in which the prospective
method could be applied in the future. It is interesting to mention
some of the famous cases in the past where it could have been used
but was not. It could have been used in Doctor v. Hughes'8 1 to
knock out the ancient doctrine of worthier tide. It could have been
used for in rem judgments in Pennoyer v. Neff.8 2 It could have
been used in the legacy area in Fox v. Snow."~ It could have been
used to improve the effect of residuary clauses in In re Proestler's
lVill."4  It could have been used to abolish what had become a
178 Lecture by Professor W. Barton Leach, Harvard Law School, March 21, 1966.
This has been done with Torten trusts. In re Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473
(1964).
179 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
180 See text acompanying notes 88-111 supra.
181225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
18295 U.S. 714 (1877).
183 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950).
184 232 Iowa 640, 5 N.W.2d 922 (1942). '"Where the common law is changed
by statute, the change operates prospectively .... ." Id. at 647, 5 N.W.2d at 926.
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senseless rule regarding the use of a legal seal in Crowley v. Lewis."85
The list of "could haves" is long; however, it does no good to go on
with them because they are only "could haves." The courts in these
cases could have been innovators in the best common law tradition,
but they were not. Instead, they helped to preserve doctrines and
rules that should have been extinguished.
Where a court has to change ancient rules to keep up with a
changing society, and where a court wants to look at policies with-
out being hampered by justified reliance, these are the cases in which
the prospective method should be employed. Most of all, the court
must realize that prospective overruling is not only perfectly ac-
ceptable as a judicial tool but also is one of the best tools for legal
innovation. "We must work with the system; Pasteur could go
aside to develop his new truths and demonstrate their usefulness;
but we cannot get legal change except by persuading those in au-
thority to make it."'8 6
185239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925).
186 Snyder, supra note 170, at 127.
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